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COMPLICITY

James G. Stewart*

Abstract
Complicity is responsibility for helping. This essay provides a
comparative overview of the criminal law and theory pertaining to
complicity. Instead of taking a strong prescriptive position on the best way
to construct accomplice liability, it charts a series of recurrent normative
problems in this area and points to various solutions these problems have
generated in practice. The essay begins by considering structural
questions that inform the shape accomplice liability is given in different
criminal systems, then discusses the conduct required to establish
accomplice liability, before plotting the various static and dynamic mental
elements that are frequently allocated to the concept. Overall, the essay
suggests that a comparative approach is very helpful in shedding light on
blind spots in various schools of thought about complicity, including
whether it deserves an autonomous existence separate from perpetration. I
conclude that the subject deserves our ongoing intellectual engagement,
since it goes to the heart of our attempts to live decently, in this our very
imperfect world.
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“[s]urveying complicity's hazy theoretical landscape can, depending on
the commentator's nerve, temperament, and resilience, induce feelings
running from hand-rubbing relish to hand-on-the-brow gloom.”
K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Complicity is responsibility for helping. If I am planning to rob a
bank, my chances of succeeding are appreciably increased if I enlist others
to assist me. A division of labor enables me to take the cash from the bank
vault, while a partner in crime detains the manager at gunpoint. Thus,
from a consequentialist perspective, the criminal law should punish my
assistants too, in order to deter would-be helpers who lower barriers to
criminal offending.2 Likewise, on a deontological basis, accomplices share
responsibility for the crimes they assist. If we are accountable for the
harms we bring into the world, focusing on just the individual who makes
the final contribution to the realization of a criminal offense overlooks the
often important, sometimes decisive, difference accomplices make to
criminal endeavors and, on occasion, their solidarity with the perpetrator.
Accomplices deserve punishment to rebalance the moral ledger, express
disapprobation in ways that shore up the community’s common
condemnation of prohibited conduct, or to respect their own dignity.
And yet, crafting standards of complicity that achieve these ends
poses a set of beautiful conceptual problems. Perhaps most fundamentally,
my confederate in the bank heist did not steal anything—I am the only one
who takes property from the bank. This might not be an especially vexing
problem if the wording of the criminal offense did not require “taking
property”, which only I did; or if accomplice liability did not make my
assistant responsible for one and the same crime. But to borrow John
Gardner’s metaphor (which draws on murder not robbery), as far as
complicity goes, it is as if the accomplice pulled the trigger herself.3 Of
course, she often did not. But why the qualifier “often”? Now the real
1

K. J. M. SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 4 (1991).
GABRIEL HALLEVY, THE MATRIX OF DERIVATIVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 33 (2012).
3
John Gardner, “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure”: An English View of Complicity, in
EINZELVERANTWORTUNG UND MITVERANTWORTUNG IM STRAFRECHT, 228 (Albin Eser,
Barbara Huber, & Karin Cornils eds. 1998).
2
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complexity begins; perhaps my confederate’s role was so dominant in the
criminal enterprise that she is the real perpetrator, and I her accomplice.
Alternatively again, might we say that there are no accomplices here at all,
since we jointly designed and executed the robbery in concert? Complicity
is helping, but what does that mean?
In what follows, I offer an overview of the various answers to
these questions. Throughout, I draw on comparative criminal law and
theory, which proves helpful in exposing blind spots in the various schools
of thought about accomplice liability. For instance, most Anglo-American
scholarship on complicity assumes that I am inevitably the perpetrator in
my hypothetical, and that my colleague’s responsibility is to be assesses
using complicity, regardless of whether he is the real perpetrator, a coperpetrator or a more peripheral aid. German criminal theory, on the other
hand, is not wedded to the idea that my colleague is an accomplice,
although the analytical tools it develops to make that determination are
sometimes more sophisticated than satisfying, and assume the need to
distinguish between perpetrators and accomplices at all. In what follows, I
explore and take issue with both approaches.
A disclaimer at the outset. Of necessity, I am unable to traverse an
extensive terrain in this high altitude survey, so I have elected to limit my
attention to the paradigm case of complicity: aiding and abetting. Thus,
assume in my burglary scenario that I am able to convince a bank clerk to
provide me with the code to the vault ahead of time in exchange for a cut
of my takings at the bank. This clerk was not at the bank when the robbery
took place, played no part in the planning and has no ongoing relationship
with me; she merely saved me the time, expense and inconvenience of
using explosives to open the safe. The question is, under what conditions
can we hold her responsible for the armed robbery she assists? As we will
see, the interweaving pathways we must tread to answer this question are
elaborate, the conceptual terrain often treacherous, and where you end up
very much depends on where you begin.
II. PRELIMINARY STRUCTURAL ISSUES
So much of the content of complicity is contingent on core structural
commitments, but too often, we rush into the intriguing controversies
without having fully contemplated these core questions. In this section, I
sketch the bare bones of four preliminary controversies, in preparation for
the short journey through the labyrinth of accomplice liability that awaits.
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Complicity and Perpetration

There is a latent defect in the foundations of Anglo-American
complicity theory. English speaking scholars assume that the accomplice
is always the person who assisted the physical perpetrator, and that the
perpetrator was whoever personally performed the requisite verb in the
crime’s definition (i.e. “taking” in burglary). Only part of that assumption
is sound—complicity is the remainder of responsibility by participation
left over once perpetration is subtracted. Thus, as Carl Erik Herlitz
explains, the problem of defining complicity is broadly analogous to
defining “night”; if you can adequately define “day” the project takes care
of itself.4 For complicity too, the meaning we attach to it is inexorably
bound up in our definition of perpetration, which requires brief treatment
by way of introduction. But at the risk of spoiling the plot, the idea that
the accomplice never does the "taking" warps understandings of
complicity.
German criminal theorists call the assumption that the accomplice is
whoever helps without satisfying the definition of the crime the
“objective theory of perpetration.”5 On this theory, the perpetrator is
someone who actually pulled the trigger, meaning that the individual
wielding the weapon creates the object to which complicity attaches. The
question becomes, who assisted the person with the gun? And yet, this
view of the perpetration/complicity binary was abandoned in much of
Europe in the first half of the 19th century, when theorists like Feuerbach
exposed its hidden flaw.6 In cases where an actor pulling the trigger was
merely an innocent proxy for a puppet master in the background, it
seemed perverse to call the mastermind a mere accomplice when she was
really the prime mover in the whole criminal affair. The puppet master did
not satisfy the definition of the crime, and yet it was her undertaking.
Therefore, the objective theory of perpetration failed to single out the real
accomplice.
Instead, Continental theorists attempted to develop an integrated
concept of complicity that was sensitive to a revised notion of perpetration
(as compared with common lawyers, who were content to retain the
4

CARL ERIK HERLITZ, PARTIES TO A CRIME AND THE NOTION OF A COMPLICITY OBJECT:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED BY THE MODEL PENAL CODE,
SWEDISH LAW AND CLAUS ROXIN 40–41 (1992).
5
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 654–655 (1978); Neha Jain,
Individual Responsibility for Mass Atrocity: In Search of a Concept of Perpetration, 61
AM. J. COMP. L. 831–871 (2013).
6
Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, Problems of Justification and Excuse in the Setting of
Accessorial Conduct, 1986 BYU L. REV. 611, 613–614 (1986).
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objective theory and treat innocent agency as a category apart). The initial
step away from the objective theory of perpetration, saw the rise of a
subjective alternative—a perpetrator became someone who takes the
crime “to be his own,” and by implication, an accomplice is a person who
takes herself to be assisting “the act of another.”7 In time, this turn to the
subjective also fell out of favor. The reasons were myriad, but the
possibility that no one might think of themselves as playing the lead role
in a joint crime was chief among them. In the place of the subjective
theory, a mixed objective/subjective test gained ascendancy based on an
assessment of who has hegemony or control over the criminal act.8
Whatever the merit of these contrasting theories of perpetration,
they highlight a point of monumental significance for the journey to
come—Anglo-Americans’ theory of complicity is built on shaky ground.
In particular, the idea that “all actors whose conduct does not satisfy the
definition of the offense are accessories” is conceptually unsafe.9 This
insight has major implications for the contours we give to complicity. If
we cannot tell automatically whether the standards we are discussing
attach to the mafia boss, the foot soldier in the prison camp or the
businessperson selling weapons, we should proceed with great caution that
our intuitions about one category do not spill over into an entirely
different scenario. Bald intuitions that overlook this point are sometimes
damaging.
B.

Mode of Participation, Inchoate Offence or Separate Crime

Complicity can be located in one of a number of places.
Traditionally, it functions as a form of participation, meaning that it
allocates responsibility to the accomplice for the perpetrator’s
consummated offence. According to this orthodox understanding,
complicity is a device within the general part of the criminal code that
matches the helper’s agency with the crimes they assist. It is precisely this
participation-type structure that creates many of the wonderful conceptual
difficulties we later explore, from the verbal inconsistency between the
requirements of the crime and the actions of the accomplice (the latter is
held responsible for murder even though she did not personally “kill”

7

FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 655.
Fletcher, supra note 5, at 655; Schreiber, supra note 6, at 626; HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS
PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 30–33 (2009).
9
FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 655.
8

2013]

COMPLICITY

7

anyone) to perceived difficulties with causation between accomplice and
completed offence.
The second option is to make complicity an inchoate offence
comparable to attempt. This model enjoys some powerful support. For
Christopher Kutz, for example, the quintessence of complicity lies in the
risk-enhancing character of the accomplice’s act, meaning that the only
real inquiry is whether the accomplice’s actions were “of the type to make
a difference.”10 We return to these ideas in some depth momentarily, but
at this juncture, observe how many leading scholars join Kutz in arguing
that complicity is best reconstructed as a form of inchoate liability,11 in
sharp contrast with the manner in which it functions as a matter of
doctrine in most jurisdictions presently. On this inchoate account, the
concept is transformed into culpable conduct that increases the risk of
criminal harm, regardless of whether or not that harm occurs—the bank
clerk is responsible for burglary, even if I do not use the code she
supplied.
The third option treats complicit as a separate offence. In a number
of jurisdictions, lawmakers have enacted a separate crime that no longer
couples with other offences like burglary, effectively relocating
accomplice liability from the general to the special part of the criminal
code. On this vision of complicity, the bank clerk who provided the code
for the safe would be convicted of a separate crime called “criminal
facilitation”, not burglary. While these facilitation offenses are
increasingly common,12 they invariably complement rather than replace
traditional participation-type notions of complicity. In a subsequent
section, we assess the merit of this approach in greater detail. For now,
note simply how there are credible reasons for situating complicity among
forms of participation, inchoate offences and the special part of the

10

Christopher Kutz, The Philosophical Foundations of Complicity Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW, 5–6 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds.,
2011); See also Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289–305
(2007).
11
See also Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 25 (1996).
12
For discussions of these new statutes in US jurisdictions and in England, see
respectively, Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 217–281,
261–270 (2000) (note that some of the facilitation statutes discussed are not inchoate, in
that they require the crime facilitated to have occurred); ANDREW ASHWORTH,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (6 ed. 2009) (discussing three genuinely inchoate offences
passes as part of the Serious Crime Act 2007 in England and Wales. The new crimes are
labelled “Encouraging and Assisting Crime,” and do not require that the crime is
consummated.)
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criminal code, and that all models are reflected in extant doctrine
somewhere in the world.13
C.

Between Unitary and Differentiated Models

The next preliminary issue is existential—why have complicity at all
when a broader notion of perpetration can envelop it? Put differently, is it
really important that forms of responsibility mark the type and degree of
participation, or could we just condense them into a single concept that
ensures uniform standards? Thus, in addition to those arguments for
uprooting then replanting complicity in different parts of the criminal code
(forms of participation, inchoate offences, or special part), we must also
consider whether we should not just remove complicity to the sentencing
phase. According to advocates for what German theorists call the unitary
theory of perpetration (“Einheitstäterschaft”), this option has a range of
philosophical advantages.14 These arguments have great consequences for
the content of complicity to which we turn subsequently, so warrant brief
introduction here.
The unitary theory of perpetration comes in three varieties, although
some might contest whether the third species really fits within the genus.15
The first, known as a pure unitary theory, treats a causal contribution to a
crime coupled with the requisite blameworthy moral choice as necessary
and sufficient elements of responsibility (excuses and justifications aside).
On this view, complicity is stripped of any autonomous existence outside
a capacious notion of perpetration. So, instead of attempting to
manufacture fine-tuned rules that define complicity in such and such a
manner, a unitary theory of perpetration places it and all other modes of
participation in a big pot, then boils them all down to their shared essence.
Through this distillation, blame attribution involves deciding whether
13

Of these options, inchoate versions of complicity are the rarest, but they do exist. See
Jørn Vestergaard, Criminal Participation in Danish Law - Uniformity Unlimited?, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY IN TRANSITION FINISH AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 475–
490 (Raimo Lahti & Kimmo Nuotio eds., 1992).
14
I have advocated for the unitary theory of perpetration in international criminal law.
See James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25
LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 165–219 (2012); For arguably the leading text in Germany, see
THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR VON
EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIVFUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE (1st ed. 2009). For an overview of countries that adopt
the unitary theory, see JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 121, 133 (2e ed. 2002).
15
Wolfgang Schöberl, Die Einheitstäterschaft als europäisches Modell: die
strafrechtliche Beteiligungsregelung in Österreich und den nordischen Ländern, 2006.
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accused X is responsible for crime Y based on settled core principles that
pay no regard to the form participation takes, leaving their moral
significance to be assessed post hoc by judges at the sentencing phase of a
trial.
The second variant provides more detail, without compromising the
unitary theory's core commitments.16 The pure unitary theory has faced a
barrage of criticism from differentialists, who object that cramming forms
of participation into a single vessel does not forewarn would-be criminals
of their exposure to potentially serious criminal responsibility, thereby
violating the principle of legality. To address this concern, a number of
states adopt a watered down unitary concept—called a functional unitary
theory of perpetration—that at least articulates the different forms of
causal connections that might apply within a unitary framework:
responsibility might involve carrying out the offence personally,
instructing others to do so, providing necessary assistance, or assistance
that is readily available elsewhere. On either the pure or functional unitary
theories, however, complicity is just like perpetration not attempt.
Third, some argue that subjecting accomplices to the same range of
punishment as perpetrators also constitutes a weak type of unitary theory.
In Germany (and the many jurisdictions that follow its example), aiders
and abettors are sentenced to a maximum of three quarters of the penalty
for the offense they facilitate, whereas the sentence for instigators is taken
from the same sentencing range as principals.17 To a large extent, this
discrepancy in maximum sentence drives the need for differentiating
between perpetrators and accomplices, even if “[r]emarkably little effort is
spent on justifying this differentiation”.18 Nonetheless, this approach
generates a tendency to look upon systems that formally equate sentencing
ranges for perpetrators and accomplices (in France and England, for
example),19 as soft iterations of the unitary theory. If this third variant is
accurately described as unitary, it places no restriction on the substantive
16

DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, DER EINHEITSTÄTER IM STRAFRECHT 22 (1971) (explaining
how a very formal notion of the unitary theory was displaced by a more functional or
material view of unitary perpetratorship).
17
Strafgesetzbuch, § 26, 27 and 49. For a modern English translation, see MICHAEL
BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 43, 50
(2008).
18
Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J INT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 977–1001, 984 (2007). For attempts to justify the distinction based on
the perpetrator’s “important criminal energy”, see CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL. BD. 2: BESONDERE ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT 231 (1.
A. ed. 2003).
19
The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c.98), s. 8 (emphasis added)
(stating that the accomplice “shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a
principal offender.”)
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elements of accomplice liability of complicity, whereas other unitary
theories do.

D.

Complicity and Justifications

Oftentimes, the core elements of accomplice liability are forced to
accommodate anxieties about the guilt or innocence of would-be
accomplices, when these anxieties are better processed elsewhere in a
tripartite structure of crime. The justification of necessity is a prime
example. How is it that necessity might ease some of the normative load
complicity is frequently asked to shoulder, allowing for a more principled
election from the various models identified above? Might it be that where
we position complicity in the architecture of criminal justice and the
model we employ to achieve our objectives also requires an appreciation
of justifications? In what follows, I draw on an important English case that
bears this point out, highlighting a background issue that we return to
when we come to debates about the mental element required for
complicity.
In a famous English case called Gillick, a group of doctors sold
contraceptives to underage patients in a bid to prevent teenaged
pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.20 By implication, however,
these doctors were also knowingly facilitating sexual intercourse among
juveniles, making the doctors complicit in statutory rape. Although the
issue arose in a civil not criminal trial, the House of Lords used the
occasion to further the longstanding contest between purpose and
knowledge as mental elements for complicity (subjects we return to in
some detail further below). But as leading British commentators suggest,
the better approach was to consider this scenario as an instance of
necessity,21 rather then allowing intuitions about guilt or innocence to
corrupt the contours of complicity itself. How is this approach
advantageous?
By allowing necessity to function together with mental elements for
complicity lower than purpose, we arguably create a model that is better
calibrated to moral nuance. On the one hand, this combination avoids
creating a safe harbor for indifferent assistants, who deliberately help
sometimes massive criminal wrongs without desiring their occurrence in a
strong volitional sense. Think of the suppliers of the chemical asphyxiant
20

Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112.
DAVID C. ORMEROD, SMITH & HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 102–103 (12th ed. 2008);
ASHWORTH, supra note,12 at 418.

21
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Zyklon B to the S.S. for use at Auschwitz,22 who would quickly point to
their commitment to profit maximization as the true purpose of their
supply. Surely this is inadequate, especially when indifference suffices for
the perpetration of the crime with which they are charged. On the other
hand, the necessity/complicity combination exonerates assistance that
simultaneously promotes a set of laudable values that outweigh the harm
inflicted.23 Whatever the case, the availability of justifications has major
ramifications for the definition we assign complicity.
III. THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF COMPLICITY
In order to guard against thought-crimes, guilt by association or
punishment based on status, a wrongful act calibrated to the definition of
the crime is widely regarded as “a primary candidate for a universal
principle of criminal liability.”24 But what action is required of the
accomplice, particularly when someone else will frequently (but not
invariably) complete the crime? In the abstract, the best we can say is that
the accomplice assists, but once we move to concretize what this means, a
range of thorny questions arise that have generated contradictory
approaches in theory and doctrine. As we will see, these debates go to the
heart of questions about where to situate complicity within the criminal
law and touch on all the contextual issues we traversed in the previous
section.
A.

Practical Assistance and Moral Encouragement

The conduct required from complicity can involve actions or
omissions, practical assistance or moral encouragement. In other words,
the assistance that might constitute complicity is not limited by type. In
some systems, criminal legislation provides certain illustrations, chief
among which is “providing the means,” but these references are never
exhaustive of the forms help might take. After all, how could one catalog
22

United Nations War Crimes Commission, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others “The
Zyklon B Case,” 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93.
23
For helpful discussions of the relationship, see Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and
the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491 (1989);
Schreiber, supra note 6.
24
FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 420; But see Douglas N. Husak, The Alleged Act
Requirement in Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL
LAW (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011).
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all types of assistance without creating loopholes for the imaginative? The
conduct element of accomplice liability must therefore be open-ended,
meaning that a whole raft of behaviors can assist crimes, ranging from
providing weapons to driving getaway cars and cheering from the
peripheries. In part, the perilous path the theory of complicity must travel
stems from this breadth, especially when the accomplice’s conduct is
“otherwise innocent.”25
According to Christopher Kutz, this characteristic of complicity
produces a stark asymmetry—any type of conduct can constitute
complicity but perpetration is circumscribed. “The principal’s actions are
only a basis for liability if they satisfy the relatively constraining
templates of substantive criminal law: they are burnings or batterings or
killings or rapings or robbings, or attempts thereof. By contrast, virtually
any kind of act, speech or otherwise, can satisfy the act requirement of
accomplice liability, for virtually anything one person does can be a form
of assistance or encouragement to the other.”26 While this reflection is
insightful, we should also temper the sense that the asymmetry is unique
to complicity; that view presupposes the objective theory of perpetration
but other (more popular) alternatives reveal that all forms of participation
can sometimes involve this breadth. As we saw earlier, accomplices might
be those doing the batterings and killings perpetrators mastermind.
Moral encouragement can also constitute assistance. If I yell support
to a stranger who is about to kill a common enemy, am I responsible for
the murder that follows? Most jurisdictions rightly answer in the
affirmative, but the hypothetical brings delicate problems in causation to
the fore. Assuming that assistance must affect the realization of the crime,
how do we establish that the encouragement made a difference to the
perpetrator’s decision to carry out the offence? Worse, what if the
perpetrator never heard my enthusiastic encouragements, meaning that I
positively desired, endorsed and supported the criminal wrongdoing,
without contributing to it? Is a psychological disposition coupled with
some action upon it sufficient for accomplice liability, or have we fallen
down the precipice into the realm of thought crimes we feared at the
outset?
Omissions can form the basis for accomplice liability too, where
would-be accomplices labor under a legal obligation to act. If I rob a bank
and a policeman stationed just outside decides not to apprehend me in
order to help, he is potentially an accomplice, despite having done quite
literally nothing. Of course, there is something of a fiction in the equation
25

Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code - 2, CRIMINAL LAW
REVIEW 98, 101 (1990).
26
Kutz, supra note 10, at 294.
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omission + duty = action, but that white lie is not particular to
complicity27, and therefore, it offers no analytical leverage in the contest
between the various models of accessorial liability. In fact, given the
structural congruity of commission and complicity, one wonders with
Michael Moore why accomplice liability is not subsumed within generic
principles of attribution.28 This reasoning suggests one of the stronger
versions of the unitary theory of perpetration, where complicity and
perpetration are symmetrical, mirroring one another with perfection. At
the same time, the argument is also vulnerable to the litany of criticisms
differentialists offer against condensing responsibility into a single
concept.
B.

The Nature and Extent of Derivative Liability

The term “derivative liability” is frequently used to describe
accomplice liability, but it is less frequently defined. What precisely is this
derivative liability, and if we embrace it, are we safely fenced off against a
collapse into vicarious liability, a.k.a. guilt by association? For Sanford
Kadish, vicarious liability is (illiberal) punishment based only on a
relationship between the parties, whereas derivative liability requires an
action and blameworthy choice on the part of the secondary party, apt to
“make it appropriate to blame him for what the primary actor does.”29 But
here too, the different models I presented earlier furnish a set of
alternative understandings, which frequently pass under the radar in
accounts that neglect comparative theory. Complicity can certainly
embrace derivative liability with varying degrees of intensity, but it can
also discard the derivative structure altogether.30 In what follows, I expand
on several of these possibilities.
How could complicity without derivative liability work? Could we
really deny that complicity is responsibility “for what the primary actor
does”, reimagining the concept as responsibility for one’s own actions
(including their causal imprint occasioned through others)? True, few
27

Marcelo Ferrante, Causation in Criminal Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIMINAL LAW
REVIEW 470–497 (2008); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN
ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009).
28
Michael S Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 395 (2007).
29
Sanford H Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985).
30
Poland offers an example of complicity without derivative liability in existing doctrine.
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countenance this conceptual possibility, assuming it is axiomatic that
complicity must take derivative form. For instance, George Fletcher
defines accessorial liability as “all those who are held derivatively liable
for another’s committing the offense,”31 without entertaining alternative
possibilities. On this account, one is compelled to manufacture an act and
choice that adequately bridge the distance between an accomplice’s
agency and the perpetrator’s wrongdoing (for which the accomplice is
blamed), conscious all the while of the short distance to vicarious liability
and other evils.
Needless to say, this engineering produces important downstream
consequences. Most strikingly, the derivative nature of complicity dictates
that even the most nefarious would-be accessory, who does everything in
her power to facilitate someone else’s crime, is complicit in nothing if a
perpetrator does not act wrongfully. No crime, no complicity. So, if X
sends a crowbar to her friend Y in prison in order for Y to use it to break
out of prison, there is nothing to be responsible for if Y dies before ever
receiving the crowbar. This, once again, draws us back into the competing
models of complicity we witnessed to begin, especially arguments that
complicity should be reinvented as a form of inchoate liability. Why
should the accomplice escape justice if her actions and moral choice are
identical whether the crime is consummated or not, but by a matter of pure
chance, the perpetrator does not act as she imagined?
To at least minimize this apparent absurdity, observe the gradual
diminution of derivative liability historically. Initially, derivative liability
was so intense that the accomplice would escape prosecution if the
principal perpetrator was never apprehended, prosecuted and convicted.32
In England it was only in 1848 that it became possible to indict, try,
convict and punish an accessory before the fact “in all respects as if he
were a principal felon”,33 regardless of whether the perpetrator was first
brought to trial and convicted. Around the same time, Continental systems
made a similar shift, which reduced the principal’s perpetration of the
crime to a contested issue within the accessory’s trial. With these changes,
the formal reliance on derivative liability within complicity became less
intense, although it still remained a central feature of the doctrine.
Recently, the intensity of derivative liability has continued to
dissipate. In most modern national jurisdictions, an accomplice can now
be held responsible where the principal perpetrator’s crime is excused, say
when an accomplice assists someone insane to commit a crime. As a
31
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result, most contemporary notions of complicity entail only a “limited or
partially derivative character” (“limitierte Akzessorietat”).34 Although the
moral basis for this dilution is plain enough (why excuse an accomplice if
the perpetrator dies, disappears or is insane?), it also gives rise to
normative complications. How do we determine the responsibility of
someone who gives you a gun intending that you kill W, but fortuitously,
W attacks you first and you kill him with the gun in self-defense? Perhaps
the derivative component of complicity should erode completely, making
the person who provides the weapon responsible for murder even though
you are not?
This brings us back to the unitary theory of perpetration, which
seems to affirm this normative position. According to a number of
commentators, the unitary theory successfully unshackles itself from the
binds of derivative liability, by asserting that “each causal contributor to
the crime is individually liable for his own conduct.”35 Some even argue
that “the central point of contention between unitarian and differentiated
systems in regard to the criminal liability of accessories can thus be found
in the question whether the liability of the accessory is derived from the
wrong committed by the perpetrator, or whether it is autonomous.”36 So,
instead of conceiving of a single murder as containing a discrete quantum
of wrongdoing to be distributed between perpetrators and accomplices, a
unitary theory posits as many murders as there are participants, even
though they all involve the same dead body.
To be clear, these positions are certainly open to dispute. Why
must the unitary theory do without the derivative structure anyway? Could
it not be possible for a pure or functional unitary theory to harmonize
objective and subjective elements for all types of participation in a crime,
but still allow a partial derivation from the perpetrator in cases such as
these? Most fundamentally, is it fair to convict the person who supplies
me with a weapon I use to defend myself of murder, just because he
wanted the deceased dead? If these and other related questions require
greater attention in the theory of accomplice liability, they at least caution
against overly categorical avowals that complicity is responsibility for
someone else’s offence or rushes to inchoate liability to deal with perverse
results born of the derivative structure. As is frequently the case with
complicity, any one problem has a variety of plausible solutions that
heavily depend on prior commitments.

34
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The Causation Quandary

Causation is one of the central dilemmas in accomplice liability. The
positions on whether an accomplice’s conduct must make a causal
contribution to a completed crime are so highly disputed in theory and
practice that the issue probably acts as a pivot for the different ways of
constructing accessorial liability set out earlier. One could write tomes on
this issue alone, so I content myself in merely setting out core parameters
of the debate(s) in broad strokes. As will become apparent, the initial
tension pits those who view the perpetrator’s voluntary human acts as an
intervening cause that impedes the passage of causal power from
accomplice through perpetrator to crime, but it also involves misgivings
about situations where there are multiple sufficient causes for a single
event. I deal with both in turn, highlighting a selection of issues that arise
under the umbrella of each debate.
Following the seminal work of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré on
causation, most English-speaking commentators have argued that the
volitional actions required to convict the direct perpetrator preclude the
claim that the accomplice too caused the harm.37 The perpetrator made a
genuine decision; this interrupts all earlier causal influence, and acts as an
intervening cause. On this account, the accomplice’s actions are no more
the cause of a crime than the perpetrator’s genes, family history and socioeconomic background, all of which undoubtedly provide influence,
without overriding the perpetrator’s blameworthy moral choice.38 As a
consequence, various accounts of complicity emerged that attempted to
sooth the cognitive dissonance created by treating complicity as a mode of
participation, when participation could not be established by the usual
metrics.39
While Hart and Honoré’s masterpiece captivated Anglo-American
views of the topic for several decades, there is much that now points in the
opposite direction. First, instigation offers a clear counterpoint—if X pays
a hitman to assassinate his wife, we have little trouble in declaring that
both X and the hitman caused the wife’s death.40 Moreover, German
understandings of cause, effect and agency all deny voluntary human
37
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Kadish, supra note 29, at 333.
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actions the ability to annihilate the enduring causal influence of the
accomplice’s act,41 a position that coincides with Michael Moore’s more
recent scholarship, which searched high and low for a metaphysical
justification for the notion of intervening causes, coming up empty
handed.42 In all of these instances, we have grounds for thinking that
causation matters for complicity if it matters for criminal responsibility at
all.
Indeed, an argument from the debate about whether causation
matters for responsibility generally works for complicity, too. In this
regard, Michael Moore draws on Susan Wolf—we would be appalled by
someone who treated negligent driving that killed an infant as merely a
question of poor driving, in the same way that we would view someone
who blamed themselves for killing an infant when they merely drove
negligently as psychically imbalanced.43 By extrapolation to complicity,
when we try business representatives as accomplices in atrocity for selling
asphyxiants to Auschwitz, we are not just concerned about their
associations with the Nazis; we mean to single out a particular type of
conduct and its unspeakable causal impact. Associating with the wicked is
one thing, but offering a substantial causal contribution to a mass killing is
altogether qualitatively different. Causation tracks this distinction.
If this reasoning is sound, it sheds new light on the shortcomings of
treating complicity as a separate offence. To return to Auschwitz, a
separate offence approach to accomplice liability would convict the
suppliers of Zyklon B of criminal facilitation—not murder, extermination
or genocide.44 This alternative may overcome evidential difficulties
associated with proving complicity or anxieties about its possible
overreach, but it also gravely understates guilt to convict the vendors of
the chemical used to gas in excess of four million people of a crime
labeled “criminal facilitation.” As I have argued elsewhere, the label of a
crime is a key feature of the punishment inflicted upon a criminal, and
accomplices are no exception.45 Therefore, even if one thinks that a new
41

See, for instance, WOLFGANG JOECKS, in: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd
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separate offence of complicity complements the more traditional
participatory model nicely, when the crime (here genocide) does take
place and the accomplice’s actions make an unequivocal contribution to it
(here providing the means), convicting the accomplice of “criminal
facilitation” seriously miscommunicates responsibility for what really
transpired.
What of overdetermined forms of complicity? In many instances, an
accomplice provides assistance that makes no discernible difference to the
occurrence of criminal harm, since the assistance provided was not
essential to the crime’s realization.46 If the Nazis had access to a long line
of willing suppliers of chemical asphyxiants, it would be difficult to argue
that the suppliers of Zyklon B really caused the terrible ends to which
their chemicals were put. As one of the defendants claimed, had he not
agreed to supply the chemicals to Auschwitz, “the S.S. would certainly
have achieved their aims by other means.”47 So if causation means “but
for” causation then even if this firm did not furnish the S.S. with the
means of exterminating humans en masse, the horror of Auschwitz would
still have unfolded almost identically. Thus, many argue that complicity
cannot require a causal connection between assistance and completed
crime, leading us back into the case for alternative models.
This dilemma also leads to at least one important strategy for sidestepping the problem without reinventing complicity as a concept. Sanford
Kadish, for instance, argued that we need a new notion for measuring the
“success” of an accomplice’s help, given two key features of the concept.
First, assistance that has absolutely no impact on the crime is not culpable,
say when I send a crowbar to a friend in prison in the hope he can use it to
break out, but it arrives after the friend scales the prison wall (derivative
liability). Second, accomplices frequently make no discernable difference
at all, yet we insist on their responsibility (overdetermination). In
response, Kadish suggests that the core question should be whether the
accomplice’s help “could have contributed to the criminal action of the
principal.”48
This thesis fails on two scores. First, raising the risk of an event will
not suffice for causation if in fact the risk is not realized. The vendors of
Zyklon B undoubtedly “could have contributed” to the Holocaust by
supplying asphyxiants, but if we modulate the facts somewhat such that at
James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MODERN LAW
REVIEW 217–246 (2008).
46
James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189–1218
(2012).
47
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 102.
48
Kadish, supra note 29, at 359.
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the last minute all prisoners at Auschwitz were shot not gassed, it is
undeniable that the company directors of Tesch & Stabenow did not play a
causal role in the deaths that actually transpired.49 If causation matters to
responsibility, risk raising itself will not do. Second, overdetermined
causes are universally considered a species of causation, even if
philosophical justifications for that view are surprisingly difficult to come
by.50 Excluding overdetermined causes would not only eviscerate a large
portion of complicity, it would also lead to intensely counterintuitive
results for perpetration—no one could ever cause murder. Everyone
eventually dies, so the serial killer merely modifies the time, place and
manner of an inevitability. If these modifications matter for perpetrators,
should they not for accomplices too?
D.

Substantial and De Minimis Contributions	
  

For many, the causal contribution an accomplice makes to an
offence must be “substantial” in order to implicate her in the
consummated crime. By insisting on substantial contributions, we erect a
threshold that excludes de minimis assistance, viz. conduct that had little
more than a trivial impact of the crime’s occurrence. To cite a neat and
often-used example, consider the responsibility of a serial murderer’s
grandmother—but for her decision to procreate the better part of a century
earlier, the murder of numerous innocents would never have transpired at
the hands of her progeny.51 But by including the grandmother in the pool
of agents responsible for these crimes, we extend accomplice liability
beyond the point of plausibility, to an extreme where it chills normal
social interaction and undermines liberal values. While this is agreed
theoretically,52 the boundaries of substantial contributions remain ill
defined and contested.
Consider the reference to “substantial contributions” in the
negotiations of the American Model Penal Code. As is well known, these
negotiations were dominated by an acute anxiety about the relationship
49
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between complicity and commerce. One aspect of the reasoning is
especially germane here—when reflecting on the objective element of
complicity, commentators to the MPC reasoned that “[a] vendor who
supplies materials readily available upon the market arguably does not
make a substantial contribution to commission of the crime since the
materials could have been gotten as easily elsewhere.”53 Unfortunately,
this explanation is less than satisfying, and speaks to the troubles created
by leaving “substantial” undefined. What is so problematic about this
explanation?
If assistance is only ever substantial if it is not readily available, the
rule excludes all overdetermined contributions from complicity. But this
reading of “substantial” would swallow the better part of complicity. If
soldier A acts as a lookout while his colleagues rape women in a prison, is
he really exonerated because another solider in his platoon would certainly
have filled his shoes had he defected? Surely not. As we saw earlier,
overdetermined forms of assistance make up a core component of any
defensible theory of accomplice liability, and excluding them from the
scope of the doctrine is unthinkable. In practice, for instance, many
criminal codes take it upon themselves to explicitly state that nonnecessary forms of assistance still amount to complicity,54 such is their
commitment to punishing forms of help that were sufficient but not
necessary. In short, overdetermined contributions must still be substantial,
otherwise the test cannibalizes an unacceptably large part of the concept.
We are left then, reluctantly agreeing with Joachim Vogel, who after
surveying much of the voluminous literature arguing for one model of
criminal attribution over another, concludes that “[t]here is a clear and
present danger that real and really important questions are neglected. For
instance, a real problem is to define the “minimum threshold” of
participation and responsibility.”55 In other words, for all the energy
expended debating unitary versus differentiated models of attribution and
the tests for differentiating different forms of participation, the lower
reaches of complicity remain under-theorized, in a world where
globalization facilities criminal offending at ever increasing rates. If

53
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accomplice liability is to be principled and not arbitrary, that situation is
inadequate.
IV. THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF COMPLICITY
If there is anything approaching universal agreement in criminal
theory, it might be that only the guilty should be punished. Punishment
without culpability is anathema to liberal notions of criminal law, even if
it does promote deterrence or other desirable utilitarian outcomes. This
insight requires that an individual make a blameworthy moral choice that
is perfectly calibrated to the meaning of the offence with which she is
convicted. But what type of choice will suffice to blame the accomplice
for “what the primary actor does,” if indeed this is the point of reference?
In what follows, I rehearse competing solutions to this question, offering
reflections on their comparative strengths and weaknesses. I consider the
three dominant tests, bearing in mind that the unitary theory of
perpetration will employ them all depending on the mental element in the
crime with which the accomplice is charged.
A.

Purpose

The American Model Penal Code requires that the accomplice helps
with “the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence.”56
Although the International Criminal Court and one or two other systems
emulate this language, purpose is a serious outlier in comparative terms.
As we noted earlier, a unitary theory of perpetration would require the
accomplice to have whatever mental element was required of a
perpetrator, which would mean a dynamic not static standard. Further
below, I set out how most other Anglo-American jurisdictions adopt
knowledge as the relevant mental element for complicity (although this
frequently, if not invariably, dilutes into recklessness in practice). Finally,
the majority of criminal systems inspired by the civil law tradition allow
dolus eventualis, an even lower standard, to suffice for complicity. The
Model Penal Code, however, facially requires “purpose,” and many have
interpreted this as bravely forging a new path that requires an accomplice
to positively desire the criminal outcome her assistance helps bring into
the world.
56
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At the outset, let me suggest that this whole vision of the MPC is
misguided. As I pointed out earlier, experts who participated in the
negotiating of the MPC were most concerned about one thing: business.
They worried that adopting knowledge as a mental element for complicity
would embroil otherwise legitimate businesses in too many criminal
offenses they had no personal stake in. Sure, I know you will use these
weapons to commit a crime, but it is no concern to me whether that crime
occurs or not, and to borrow from Glanville Williams’ memorable
objection, “[t]he law of complicity makes me my brother's keeper, but not
to the extent of requiring me to enquire whether he is engaging (or
proposing to engage) in iniquity, when my own conduct (apart from the
law of complicity) is innocent.”57 Accordingly, the experts settled on
“purpose,” presumably out of a desire to carve out a safe harbor for
business.
And yet, it is far from clear whether they achieved their goal. While
the MPC certainly begins by stating that “[a] person is an accomplice… if
with the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence,” it goes on
to insist that “[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice
in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense.”58 For leading American scholars and the vast majority of state
jurisdictions in America, this means that the purpose requirement goes
only to the provision of the assistance (my purpose was to give you the
weapon), leaving the mental element in the crime with which the
accomplice is charged to determine the culpability requisite for the
attendant consequences my actions caused (if I was reckless about
consequences, I am complicit if recklessness is sufficient for the crime in
question).59
Thus, the concept of complicity in the MPC is actually startlingly
similar to the unitary theories of perpetration. Notice, for example, how
the second component of complicity’s definition in the MPC is dynamic in
tenor, requiring parity between the mental element for accomplice and that
57
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for perpetrator. As I detailed earlier, this desire for equivalence of mental
elements between accomplice and perpetrator is a hallmark of unitary
theories of perpetration, which deny the need for the forms of participation
differentialists hold dear (even while they struggle in vain to reach
agreement on quite how to draw said distinctions). By no small
coincidence, the authors of the MPC shared the skepticism about the
differentialists’ program, denying complicity any autonomous
significance.60 Surprisingly, then, the MPC actually enshrines a functional
unitary theory of perpetration.
But for the sake of analytical completeness, let us consider
“purpose” as requiring a volitional commitment to the completed crime,
that I will call the strongest form of purpose. According to the MPC, the
term “purpose” denotes conduct that is undertaken with the “conscious
object” of bringing about the criminal result.61 The point of delineation
with knowledge is fine, but “conscious object” undeniably implies a
stronger volitional disposition. As Jeroen Blomsma surmises of purpose
(in a slightly different context), “[t]he result is the reason for his conduct;
it is what matters to the actor. As a consequence, it is characterized by the
sense of having failed when the result is not achieved.”62 Thus, desires for
profit often preclude application of this standard of complicity in
commercial contexts, although at least conceptually, nothing prevents a
corporate officer from wanting to simultaneously make a handsome profit
from sales to Auschwitz and to destroy Jews.
One point of clarification about purpose is necessary. In a helpful
illustration, Antony Duff explains how one frequently does something
purposefully, without actually wanting it in a strong sense. He describes
scenarios where you reluctantly pay back a debt you have incurred or
undergo a painful operation to cure an illness, wanting the end but not the
means. Your purpose is still to have the painful operation and pay the
debt.63 Thus, I still satisfy the purpose standard by helping someone to kill
their partner in order to take a share of insurance monies, whereas I do not
60
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if I help that same person to burn down their house in order to collect
insurance monies we will share, even if I know that the wife will definitely
perish in the fire.64 If the wife lives in the former scenario, my plans are
thwarted; not so in the latter. Failure is therefore a helpful test for purpose
in complicity (assuming purpose goes to the completed offence, which it
does not as a matter of doctrine).
So, should accomplice liability turn on this distinction? While the
strongest form of purpose is sometimes celebrated as a laudable liberal
adjustment to normal principles,65 we should reflect momentarily on its
implications—by this doctrine an accomplice who acts in such a way that
she not only satisfies the mental element of the crime but makes an
essential and unjustifiable contribution to its realization is absolved of
liability. The danger is that this “elevation theory” gives an almost
unattainable height to the subjective element of complicity, misapplying
desert and mis-communicating responsibility. From a retributive
perspective, helping the partner kill her wife for insurance money when
her death is virtual certainty is perfectly sufficient for a version of murder
that only requires intent, so why require more? By demanding that the
accomplice show a purpose when a perpetrator need not, “purpose”
arguably over-corrects.
A utilitarian view of complicity generates the same result. Since
deterrence (and therefore crime prevention) is maximized by punishing
those who are aware of even the slightest risk of harm, purpose is
unattractive from a utilitarian perspective.66 Admittedly here, there are
more complicated questions about over-deterrence, which require a
careful calibration of complicity standards with the desire for free social
intercourse. Nonetheless, utilitarian concerns tend to militate against
adoption of the highest conceivable notion of blameworthy moral choice
(i.e., purpose) across the entire panoply of crimes, since complicity can
achieve greater deterrence for criminal harms by setting the mental
element at levels much closer to that defined in a crime. In short, the
strongest form of purpose under-deters accomplices by doing too little to
offset the strong incentives for offenders to enlist assistants in the
execution of their criminal plans.
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Moreover, empirical research suggests that in many instances
members of the public believe that the accomplice is blameworthy even
though they did not share the perpetrator’s criminal purpose. The subjects
of one survey reported “stark disagreement” with the “elevation thesis”
(viz. the idea that the mental element in complicity should be elevated to
purpose, that is, beyond that required within the paradigm of the crime
itself).67 Instead, respondents assigned punishments to accomplices “who
are knowing or even only reckless with respect to the criminal outcome in
instances in which the elevation view would assign no liability.”68 While
one cannot assume that these sentiments are invariable attributes of
complicity everywhere, the study at least serves as further grounds for
caution about adopting the strongest form of purpose—using this elevated
standard as the mental element for complicity may fail to match law with
popular notions of justice. Perhaps this explains why almost no
jurisdiction adopts it in practice.69
B.

Knowledge

In the earlier example about helping someone burn down a house to
collect insurance money, we concluded that the strongest version of the
purpose standard of accomplice liability would not extend liability to
virtually certain side-effects of the accomplice’s true objective. If burning
the house down would almost definitely kill the partner’s wife, the
strongest purpose standard exonerates the accomplice of murder (even
though the perpetrator is guilty of that crime). Knowledge, the second
major mental element for complicity, assigns these virtually certain sideeffects to the accomplice too, when the strongest form of purpose would
not. Put differently, knowledge diminishes the volitional commitment the
muscular version of purpose insists upon in favor of a purely cognitive
test. The result is, a static mental standard for complicity within a
differentiated system, that applies without regard to the mental elements
required in the different sorts of criminal offences it partners with.
To begin, note the comparative rationale for the purpose and
knowledge tests for complicity. If the “purpose” standard is understood in
67
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its strongest sense (which, at the risk of laboring the point, it almost never
is in practice), purpose is said to promote autonomy by precluding
criminal impediments to otherwise lawful activities that depend on social
cohesion, whereas “knowledge” promotes social control and the
prevention of crime by demanding that agents take interventionist action
when aware that their actions are enabling offending.70 In its most (overly)
ambitious guise, the knowledge standard posits that the potential aider
“might be an educative or moralizing force that causes the would-be
offender to change his mind.”71 To some extent, the Anglo-American
systems of criminal law that adopt either knowledge or purpose as
standards for complicity align themselves along these communitarian or
individualistic axes. Knowledge promotes community; a strong notion of
purpose is libertarian.
So, how does this knowledge standard work? The first challenge lies
in ascertaining just what knowledge attaches to—knowledge of what?
That question is not as straightforward as it might seem, particularly when
the offense itself fails to offer terribly much guidance. So as soon as one
utters the word knowledge, a whole series of deeply complicated, highly
debated and ultimately inconsistent responses arise,72 born of “uncertainty
as to whether the law should be concerned with [the] mental state relating
to [the accomplice’s] own acts of assistance or encouragement, to his
awareness of the principal’s mental state, to the fault requirements for the
substantive offense involved, or some combination of the above.”73 But
for present purposes, let us assume that knowledge goes to the
consummated crime the accomplice’s assistance helps produce, accepting
that this is mostly an over-simplification for convenience.
Knowledge presents epistemic troubles. How can someone know
the future? Even if member X of a terrorist organization provides her
colleague Y with a nuclear warhead for a specific terrorist mission, X
cannot know with certainty that a crime will transpire. Short of knowing
that water will flow downhill or that the sun will rise in the East, no one
can know with certainty what the future will involve, and surely few
human actions ever acquire a degree of predictability anywhere close to
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the direction of the Earth’s rotation or laws of physics.74 The obvious
solution is to think of knowledge as implying appreciation of a virtually
certain probability (akin to indirect intent), but as soon as a degree of
probability becomes the touchstone, the temptation to surreptitiously slide
into recklessness can prove irresistible.
This danger is most acute where a would-be accomplice provides
forms of assistance that can enable a wide range of crimes. Take the
classic English case of R v Bainbridge,75 where the defendant bought
oxygen-cutting equipment for an individual named Shakeshaft, who later
used it to break into a bank. Bainbridge indicated that he suspected that
Shakeshaft would use it for something illegal, but he did not know what
precisely this illegality would involve. The English House of Lords held
that it was essential to prove that the accomplice knew the type of crime
the perpetrator would commit; knowledge of mere criminal propensities
was inadequate. Conversely, if Bainbridge knew that burglary was likely
to occur with his assistance, he needn’t know that it would involve a bank,
the bank’s location, the proprietors of the bank, or the time of
perpetration.76
Before we begin to discuss this finding, note that it conforms to
interpretations of knowledge in a number of other jurisdictions. In systems
as diverse as France, England, Germany and the United States,
comparable rules do similar work,77 suggesting that knowledge of the type
of offence might be sufficient for most understandings of complicity. But
does this go too far? As Andrew Ashworth laments, this position
“introduces reckless knowledge as sufficient.”78 So perhaps knowledge
never meant knowledge at all. Still, if I throw a grenade at a car knowing
of a virtual certainty that there is someone inside the vehicle, it does not
matter whether there is a lone three month-old girl from New Zealand,
four elderly Japanese men, or a dozen pregnant Eskimos. If awareness of a
74
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virtual certainty of causing a human death is sufficient for murder, this is
all the specificity needed for perpetration. Why would complicity be any
different?
The major concern, however, is that knowledge is a fixed
requirement when the mental elements in crimes for which it assigns
blame are not. Knowledge may suffice for complicity, but what happens
when the crime in question requires a specific purpose?79 Intriguingly, the
knowledge standard in complicity tends to overpower stronger mental
elements in these crimes—in many jurisdictions, knowledge suffices for
conviction of crimes of ulterior intent, allowing the weaker complicity
standard to eviscerate the stronger character of the crime it joins with. In
David and Goliath fashion, the weaker mental element for complicity
slays the stronger counterpart in the crime. This makes for good biblical
narrative, but it is less clear whether the story ends well for theories of
complicity. By merely requiring knowledge as a necessary mental state for
conviction, accomplice liability risks distorting responsibility, as distinct
form attributing wrongdoing in line with the moral weight of the crime in
question. A unitary theory corrects for this problem, but arguably ushers
in problems of its own.
C.

Recklessness/Dolus Eventualis

Unsurprisingly, recklessness is by far the most interesting and
controversial standard for complicity. Can I really be responsible for the
crime someone else commits, by conducting myself in ways that are
“otherwise lawful,” when I merely run a risk that the offence will occur?
Is this not deeply illiberal, given the asymmetries Kutz points to between
perpetrator and accomplice? In many jurisdictions the answer is a curt no:
a concept vaguely analogous to recklessness suffices to make the
accomplice responsible for the completed offence she assists in the many
systems that employ dolus eventualis as the lowest form of intention; in
countries that adopt a unitary theory of perpetration, recklessness suffices
for complicity when it is adequate for perpetration; and if one follows
Ashworth, many (maybe all) systems that formally require knowledge
really demand recklessness. In what follows, I critically review
recklessness as a standard for complicity, treating the term as a vague
equivalent of dolus eventualis.
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For one group of commentators, recklessness is at least
refreshingly honest about its function—it avoids complicity being
rendered “a dead letter”.80 The argument again hinges on the inability to
know the future with certainty. To return to my earlier example, even if
member X of a criminal gang provides her terrorist colleague Y with a
nuclear warhead for a specific terrorist mission, X cannot know with
certainty that a crime will transpire. Thus, argue the recklessness
advocates, we either deny that complicity exists for assistance in advance
of the crime (because people can seldom know in a strong sense what
others will do in the future) or we apply a standard closer to recklessness
for accomplices who choose to undertake acts they know are inherently
risky (providing nuclear weapons to terrorists).81 In all likelihood, this
reasoning probably explains why knowledge dilutes to recklessness so
frequently in practice.
But is reckless complicity is a bridge too far? Embracing reckless
complicity would require us to continuously vet those with whom we have
dealings so that we can ensure that our interactions do not lead to
potentially serious criminal harm. This, according to many scholars,
would have the unsavory consequence of creating “blank cheque
responsibility”,82 where the aider becomes responsible for all foreseeable
consequences of their daily public interactions.83 Beyond unduly
infringing upon liberty and individual autonomy, a reckless standard of
complicity would offend liberal notions of punishment and inhibit social
intercourse.84 Especially in a world where we depend on markets to
“stabilize the pursuit of individual conceptions of the good despite
widespread moral disagreement”,85 inhibiting risky behavior by otherwise
innocent third parties arguably goes too far.
But is this always the case? Notice how the critics of recklessness
seldom mention desert, even though the notion acts as a corner piece of
any defensible theory of criminal responsibility. To conform with desert,
recklessness should be appropriate as a standard of liability for the
accomplice when it is adequate for the perpetrator. The argument
conveniently dovetails with claims that using recklessness as a standard
for complicity where recklessness suffices for the crime in question would
not imperil an individual’s autonomy or chill normal social interchange
80
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any more than reckless perpetration already does.86 Consequently, there
may be no generic difficulty to instances of reckless complicity as such; it
is really the application of recklessness across crimes whose mental
elements are more onerous that is unduly harsh. This qualified defense of
reckless complicity becomes stronger still if this account of complicity is
understood in conjunction with necessity as a justification. The result, of
course, again recalls the unitary theory of perpetration, which pairs the
mental element for complicity to that set out in the crime.

V. CONCLUSION	
  

This short essay highlights just some of the features of accomplice
liability, in ways that reveal both the “hand-rubbing relish” and “hand-onthe-brow gloom” promised in the epigraph. Alas, there is so much that has
had to go unaddressed. The essay leaves out, for instance, the doubtful
arguments by many leading theorists that the accomplice liability of
vendors approximates to omission liability, because the vendor is required
to depart from their “ordinary course of business.”87 Likewise, it makes no
mention of the substantial body of literature governing so-called “neutral
acts” (“neutrale Handlungen”),88 but in a forthcoming work, I disagree
with the view in a portion of this literature that “typical,” “ordinary” or
“commonplace” actions are excluded from the scope of accomplice
liability.89 And finally, space has not allowed discussion of what Sanford
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Kadish dubbed “non-proxyable crimes.”90 Can an accomplice who is
herself not married be convicted of bigamy if she helps a married friend
marry for a second time? These and the other problems set out here are
difficult, but they are also deserving of our ongoing intellectual energies—
complicity goes to the heart of our attempts to live an honest moral life, in
this our very imperfect world.
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